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Abstract
Overlapping labour markets arise when some types of workers do not
meet employers with some types of jobs. For example, skilled workers
could seek high-skill or low-skill jobs, but low skill workers could be lim-
ited to low-skill jobs. The paper derives conditions for equilibrium and
eﬃciency, distinguishes reducible from irreducible overlapping labour mar-
kets, and describes distributional impacts of proportional demand shifts
and technological change. Many labour models incorporate the struc-
ture of overlapping labour markets, so that the results have widespread
applicability.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A labour market can be regarded as a collection of workers and employers that
interact to allocate workers to jobs on the basis of wages and qualiﬁcations.
Overlapping Labour Markets depart from this simple description. An Overlap-
ping Labour Market (hereafter OLM) arises in a labour market with hetero-
geneous workers and jobs when direct interactions between particular types of
workers and jobs do not occur. The paper describes conditions when OLM’s
are ineﬃcient and the resulting misallocation of workers and jobs. It also shows
how OLM’s diﬀer from labour markets where all agents interact. In particular,
demand shifts, consisting of proportional changes in numbers of jobs, have dis-
tributional impacts. Skill biased technological change has consequences in an
OLM that diﬀer from responses with ordinary markets.
In the OLM considered here, unemployed workers and employers with va-
cancies meet to determine whether the worker should be employed. There are
two types of workers, s1 and s2, and two types of jobs, k1 and k2. Type s1
workers seek either k1 or k2 jobs, and employers with k2 jobs seek either s1 or
s2 workers. The distinguishing feature of OLM’s is that s2 workers do not seek
1k1 jobs, presumably because production would be too low or the workers lack
qualiﬁcations.
For example, s1 workers could be college graduates while s2 workers are high
school graduates, and k1 jobs could require high skills while k2 jobs only require
low skills. Then s1 workers could get either k1 or k2 jobs, but s2 workers would
be limited to k2 jobs. More speciﬁcally, high school graduates and college grad-
uates take jobs as salespeople, but only college graduates take jobs as managers.
High school and college graduates work as clerks, and college graduates work as
teachers. Native-born and immigrants could take manual labour jobs in a coun-
try, while management jobs could go only to native-born workers. In the context
of Spanish labour markets, Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno (2002) analyze a market
where workers with high education and low education take unskilled jobs, while
skilled jobs go to the workers with high education. Workers with land in In-
dia use their own labour and hire landless workers, while landless workers only
work for landed workers (Mandal, 2001). Labour market structures related to
OLM’s have been studied previously. Sattinger (1985) describes a labour mar-
ket where workers set reservation wages and ﬁrms set reservation skill levels,
generating OLM’s. With internal and external labour markets, both currently
employed and external workers can take port of entry jobs, while only current
workers can take other jobs (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). In dual labour mar-
kets, primary workers can seek jobs in both the primary and secondary labour
markets, while rationing limits secondary workers from entering the primary
labour market (Saint-Paul, 1996). In the analysis of overeducation, it is implic-
itly assumed that some workers with more education take jobs requiring less
education (Sicherman, 1991; Hartog, 1992, Chapter 7). Gautier (2002) analyzes
the impact on low-skilled workers when high-skilled workers temporarily accept
simple jobs. Albrecht and Vroman (2002) analyze wage inequality in a model
where low-skill workers cannot take high-skill jobs. Acemoglu (1999) considers
a model in which the skill composition of workers generates diﬀerentiation in
jobs, with high quality jobs unavailable to unskilled workers. Moen (2002) con-
siders the relative welfare of good and bad workers in a labour market where
they search in diﬀerent markets. Shi (2002) considers a directed search model
in which high tech ﬁrms receive both skilled and unskilled workers, but low tech
ﬁrms only receive low skill workers. Shi concludes that the low skill workers will
receive diﬀerent wages in the diﬀerent jobs. These examples show that many
labour markets share a common internal structure, so that general results for
OLM’s have widespread applicability.
A market where all workers are the same and all jobs are the same is termed
here an ordinary market with homogeneous agents. Labour markets with het-
erogeneous agents can often be analyzed as collections of ordinary markets with
homogeneous agents. In frictionless assignment models, workers self-select jobs
so each worker is in an ordinary market with homogeneous agents (Tinbergen,
1951, 1956; Sattinger, 1975; Teulings, 1995). For example, in Tinbergen’s analy-
sis (1956), labour market compartments form that consist of a single type of
worker and a single type of job. More recently, labour markets have been con-
sidered in which a given type of worker only searches for a given type of job
2(Moen, 1997; Shi, 2001; Mortensen and Wright, 2002). Each worker is again
in an ordinary market with homogeneous agents, but the labour market (or
compartment, to use Tinbergen’s term) is now characterized as having search
or matching frictions.
Ordinary markets with heterogeneous agents have also been considered in
which each type of worker seeks all types of jobs and each type of employer seeks
(or interviews) all types of workers. Then all workers are pooled to form the
labour supply, and all jobs are pooled to form the labour demand (Sattinger,
1995; Morgan, 1995; Lu and McAfee, 1996; Shimer and Smith, 2000).
The next section establishes the equilibrium in an OLM. Section 3 relates ef-
ﬁciency in an OLM to eﬃciency in ordinary markets with homogeneous agents.
If the OLM is irreducible, so that separate markets for s1 and s2 workers at
k2 jobs do not arise, then eﬃciency results when a particular condition holds.
Section 4 analyzes distribution. A proportional increase in all jobs can reduce
t h ew a g ed i ﬀerential between more skilled and less skilled workers. Production
changes corresponding to skill biased technological change are also considered.
Section 9 summarizes diﬀerences between results for OLM’s and previous analy-
sis and indicates future extensions.
2 Equilibrium Assignment
2.1 Solution for Ordinary Market
As a preliminary to derivation of the equilibrium assignment in an OLM, this
section derives the solution for an ordinary market with homogeneous agents
using the same underlying assumptions and notation as for the OLM. Suppose
there are Ns workers and Nk jobs. Production occurs when a worker is matched
with a job, yielding production of a. Let u be the unemployment rate for workers
and let v be the vacancy rate for jobs. Workers ﬁnd jobs through a matching
technology described by a matching function. Let M(vNk,uN s) be the rate at
which matches occur per period if there are uNs unemployed workers and vNk
vacant jobs (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo
and Pissarides, 2001; and Rogerson and Wright, 2002, for discussions of the
matching function). Assume M has constant returns to scale, is an increasing
function of its arguments, has decreasing marginal returns, and is zero if either
uNs or vNk is zero. Assume matches between workers and jobs break up at the
exogenous rate γ.
The steady state values of u and v are determined from
(1 − v)Nk =( 1 − u)Ns
γ(1 − v)Nk = M(vNk,uN s) (1)
The ﬁrst condition arises because the number of matched (or non-vacant) jobs
must equal the number of matched (or employed) workers in a steady state. The
second condition arises because the ﬂow of jobs becoming vacant must equal
the rate of formation of new matches. The steady state conditions in 1 can be
3reexpressed in terms of the ratio of vacancies to unemployed, often referred to
as market tightness. Let θ = vNk/(uNs). Since it has constant returns to scale,
M(vNk,uN s)/(uNs)=M(vNk/uNs,1). Let m(θ)=M(θ,1). Then m(θ) is the
rate at which unemployed workers get matches, and m(θ)/θ i st h er a t ea tw h i c h
vacancies get matches. Assume m(θ) is invertible, i.e. that m(θ)=x can be
solved for θ as a function of x. Using θ and m(θ), 1 becomes
(1 − v)uθ/v =1 − u
γ(1 − v)θ/v = m(θ) (2)








From diﬀerentiation and assumptions about the matching function, it can be
shown that ∂u/∂θ < 0 and ∂v/∂θ > 0. The measure of market tightness, θ,
depends on the ratio of jobs to workers in the market. Deﬁne η = Nk/Ns as
the market ratio. Then
θ = vη/u (4)





γ(γ + m0(θ)+m(θ) − θm0(θ))
> 0 (5)
Comparisons between markets are summarized as follows, using subscripts to
denote diﬀerent markets.
Theorem 1 Let η1 and η2 be the market ratios for two ordinary markets with
homogeneous agents. If η1 = η2 then θ1 = θ2,u 1 = u2 and v1 = v2. If η1 > (<
)η2 then θ1 > (<)θ2,u 1 < (>)u2 and v1 > (<)v2.
Proof. Since θ is a monotonic function of η, two markets will have the same
market tightness whenever the market ratios in the two markets are the same. If
η1 > (<)η2, comparisons between θ1 and θ2 arise from 5, and then comparisons
between unemployment and vacancy rates arise from 3, completing the proof.
Wages and proﬁts are determined through generalized Nash bargaining over
the surplus from a match as follows (Pissarides, 2000, pp. 15-17).2 Let w be
t h ew a g er a t ea n dl e tWu and We be a worker’s expected present discounted
values of income from being unemployed and employed, respectively. Then Wu
and We satisfy
rWU = m(θ)(WE − WU)
rWE = w + γ(WU − WE) (6)
1The derivatives of M with respect to its arguments are positive by assumption so that
m0(θ)=M1(θ,1) > 0 when θ>0. By Euler’s theorem, since M is homogeneous of degree one,
M(θ,1) = θM1(θ,1) + M2(θ,1). Then M2(θ,1) = M(θ,1) − θM1(θ,1) = m(θ) − θm0(θ) > 0.
The denominator in dθ/dη is therefore positive, so that dθ/dη > 0.
2It would also be possible to analyze OLM’s assuming wage posting.
4where r is the discount rate for workers. In 6, the ﬂow of value for unemployed
workers, given by rWU, equals the transition rate into employment times the
gain in value. The ﬂow of value for employed workers, rWE, equals the wage
rate plus the transition rate into unemployment times the loss in value from
the transition. Similarly, let WF and WV be the employers’ present discounted




(WF − WV )
rWF = a − w + γ(WV − WF) (7)
In generalized Nash bargaining, the ﬂow value rWU serves as the reservation
wage for workers and the ﬂow value rWV serves as the reservation proﬁtf o r
ﬁrms. Let β be the relative measure of labour’s bargaining strength. Then the
wage determined by bargaining satisﬁes
w = rWU + β(a − rWU − rWV ) (8)
Substituting the solutions for WU from 6 and WV from 7 into 8 and solving
yields
w =
aβ(r + γ + m(θ))
β(r + γ + m(θ)) + (1 − β)(r + γ + m(θ)/θ)
(9)




(1 − β)/θ + β
(10)
Then from 10 and 5,
dw/dθ > 0,d w / d η > 0 (11)
Let
Ys =( 1− u)w, Yk =( 1− v)(a − w) (12)
Then Ys is the expected income of a worker, calculated as the proportion of
time employed times the wage rate. It can be shown that Ys is the limit of rWU
as r approaches zero. Similarly, Yk is the expected income (or proﬁt) for a job.
In terms of expected incomes, the equilibrium wage rate determined through
bargaining satisﬁes
w = Ys + β(a − Ys − Yk) (13)
As θ increases, u decreases and v increases (from 3) and w increases (from 10).
Then applying 5,
dYs/dθ > 0,d Y k/dθ < 0,d Y s/dη > 0,d Y k/dη < 0 (14)
The matching function m(θ) drops out of the ratio of expected incomes, which
simpliﬁes to
Ys/Yk = βθ/(1 − β) (15)
52.2 Solution for OLM
Now suppose there are two types of workers, s1 and s2, a n dt w ot y p e so fj o b s ,k1
and k2.S u p p o s et h e r ea r eNs1 and Ns2 workers of types s1 and s2, respectively,
and Nk1 and Nk2 jobs of types k1 and k2, respectively. Let aij be the production
rate when an si worker is matched with a kj job. Matches between s2 workers
and k1 jobs do not form, generating an OLM. Assume a11 >a 12 >a 22, so that
type s1 workers are more productive than type s2,a n dt y p ek1 jobs are more
productive than type k2. Then the more productive workers have access to both
types of jobs, while the less productive workers can only get the less productive
jobs.3 Assume that the same matching function as in Section 2.1 operates in
any submarket where workers of a single type are matched with jobs of a single
type.
For the basic OLM model, suppose s1 workers choose either to seek k1 jobs
or k2 jobs, but not both. Similarly, suppose employers with k2 jobs can choose
either to seek s1 workers or s2 workers, but not both. (Section 3.3 will consider
alternatives to these assumptions and their consequences.) Given these assump-
tions, the OLM reduces to three ordinary submarkets with homogeneous agents.
Subscripts ij will be used to represent the value of a parameter or variable in
the submarket where type si workers are matched with type kj jobs. Let δ be
the proportion of type s1 workers seeking k2 jobs, and let µ be the proportion












Given these market ratios, the market tightness ratios θij in each submarket
can be determined by solving 4, the unemployment and vacancy rates can be
determined from 3, and the wage rates and expected incomes from 10 and 13.
Equilibrium in the OLM requires that s1 workers be indiﬀerent between seeking
k1 jobs or k2 jobs. This occurs when the expected incomes are equal. Equilib-
rium also requires that employers with k2 jobs be indiﬀerent between seeking
s1 and s2 workers, so that the expected incomes must be equal. Equilibrium in
the OLM therefore occurs when δ and µ are such that
Ys11 = Ys12,Y k12 = Yk22 (17)
Equilibrium can be calculated and existence and uniqueness demonstrated
using the following procedure. Consider a tentative level of market tightness
in the second submarket, b θ12. First, all of the other variables in the OLM,
including δ and µ, can be derived from b θ12. From 3 and 13, b θ12 determines
u12 and w12 and therefore Ys12 =( 1− u12)w12. By the equilibrium condition
17, Ys11 = Ys12. Then θ11 can be determined from Ys11 and η11 from 4. Since
3If instead a11 <a 12 <a 22, an alternative conﬁguration arises in which the less productive
workers have access to both job types, while the most productive workers are limited to the
most productive jobs.
6η11 = Nk1/((1 − δ)Ns1),δcan be found as 1 − Nk1/(η11Ns1). Similarly, b θ12
determines v12 and Yk12 =( 1− v12)(a12 − w12)=Yk22. Then Y22 determines
θ22, which determines η22, and µ can be determined as 1 − Ns2η22/Nk2.
Second, with all the other variables in the OLM derived from b θ12,i ti sa l s o
possible to derive a value of θ12. Let H(b θ12) be the derived value of θ12. It is
found by solving 4 for θ, with η = µNk2/(δNs1), using the derived values of δ
and µ. Equilibrium occurs when H(b θ12)=b θ12.
Theorem 2 If there is a level of b θ12 at which the derived values of δ and µ are
both positive, then an equilibrium for the OLM exists and is unique.
Proof. From Section 2.1 and the derivations of δ and µ, δ is an increasing
function of b θ12 and µ is a decreasing function of b θ12. When the derived values δ
and µ are positive, µNk2/(δNs1) is a declining function of b θ12,s ot h a tH(b θ12) is
a l s oad e c l i n i n gf u n c t i o no fb θ12.4 Using 17, it is possible to determine a value of
b θ12 at which δ =0and a diﬀerent value of b θ12 at which µ =0 . If there is a value
of b θ12 such that δ and µ are positive, there will be a lower value of b θ12 at which
δ =0and a higher value of b θ12 at which µ =0 . The equilibrium value of b θ12,
if it exists, must lie between these values. As b θ12 approaches the lower value
(from above), H(b θ12) approaches inﬁnity; as b θ12 approaches the higher value
(from below), H(b θ12) approaches zero. At an intermediate value, H(b θ12)=b θ12,
establishing existence. Since H(b θ12) is a declining function of b θ12,t h es o l u t i o n
with positive δ and µ is unique, completing the proof.
Figure 1 shows the determination of the equilibrium value of θ12 at point A,
from which all the other variables can be derived.5 The downward sloping curve
is H(b θ12), and the upward sloping line is b θ12 (i.e., the line with slope one).
3E ﬃciency
3.1 Marginal Products
Production in the OLM can be calculated as
y = Ns1(1 − δ)(1 − u11)a11 + Ns1δ(1 − u12)a12 + Ns2(1 − u22)a22 (18)
where unemployment and vacancy rates are functions of the numbers of diﬀerent
types of workers and jobs and the proportions δ and µ.
4The requirement that δ and µ be positive for some value of b θ12 r u l e so u tt h ec a s ew h e r e
no s1 workers seek k2 jobs and no employers with k2 jobs seek s1 workers.
5Figure 1 assumes Ns1 = Nk2 =2 ,N k1 = Ns2 =1 ,a 11 =2 ,a 12 =1 .5,a 22 =1 ,
β11 = β12 = β22 = .5,γ= .05, and m(θ)=θ1/2. The equilibrium occurs at δ = .496,
µ = .508, and θ12 =1 .594. In Figure 1, the minimum value of b θ12 is at .0033, where δ =0 ,
and the maximum value is at 607, where µ =0 .

















Figure 1: Determination of Equilibrium Market Tightness, θ12




























For s1 workers, separate marginal products can be calculated depending on
whether the workers match with k1 or k2 jobs. These marginal products are
combinations of the derivatives of y with respect to Ns1 and δ. Changes in Ns1
and δ aﬀect both the number of workers with k1 jobs and the number with k2
jobs. A combination that increases the number with k1 jobs by one and leaves
the number with k2 jobs the same solves
(1 − δ)4Ns1 − Ns14δ =1
δ4Ns1 + Ns14δ =0 (21)












































These marginal products are used in the next section to establish conditions for
eﬃciency in an OLM.
3.2 Conditions for Eﬃciency
Deﬁnition 3 An OLM is eﬃcient if the allocation of workers and jobs among
submarkets maximizes production.
A necessary condition for eﬃciency is that an s1 worker must have the same
marginal product whether seeking a k1 job or a k2 job, i.e. MPs11 = MPs12.
Otherwise movement of an s1 worker from one submarket to another would
raise production. Similarly, MPk12 = MPk22 is also a necessary condition for
eﬃciency. By inspection of 22 and 23, MPs11 = MPs12 if and only if dy/dδ =0 .
By inspection of 24 and 25, MPk12 = MPk22 if and only if dy/dµ =0 .6
Now consider whether decisions of workers and employers would satisfy the
necessary conditions for eﬃciency in an OLM. Workers of type s1 seek k1 or k2
jobs depending on which oﬀers a higher expected income, Ys11 or Ys12. Their
behavior brings the two expected incomes into equality, a condition for equilib-
rium in 17. Similarly, behavior of employers with type k2 jobs brings expected
incomes Yk12 and Yk22 into equality. From Section 2.1, the expected incomes
equal the reservation wages and proﬁts that workers and employers would choose
when searching for matches. If the reservation wages and proﬁts equal the cor-
responding marginal products, then worker and employer behavior would lead
to the satisfaction of the necessary conditions for eﬃciency.
The conditions for reservation wages and proﬁts to equal the corresponding
marginal products have been established in the literature on search congestion
for ordinary markets with homogeneous agents. Search congestion arises when
an agent’s reservation wage or proﬁtd i ﬀers from the agent’s marginal product,
leading to overentry or underentry in the market. Diamond (1982) established
conditions for the absence of search congestion under the assumption that the
surplus from a match is shared equally (see also Mortensen, 1982, and Lockwood,
1986, 1999). Hosios (1990, p. 286) demonstrated that search congestion is
absent if the share of the match surplus going to a worker equals the elasticity
of the matching function with respect to the number of unemployed workers. In
Section 2.1, the match surplus share is given by β,a n di nt h eO L Mt h es h a r ei n
the submarket with worker type si and job type kj is βij.
6The conditions dy/dδ =0and dy/dµ =0are suﬃcient for eﬃciency if they uniquely
determine δ and µ.
9Market mechanisms exist that would bring about the match surplus shares
satisfying the Hosios condition. Sattinger (1990, pp. 366-369) describes a non-
bargaining mechanism where employers can attract more applicants to a vacancy
by oﬀering a higher wage prior to a match. The employer ﬁrst-order condition in
equilibrium requires that expected incomes be proportional to marginal contri-
butions to interviews, which is equivalent to the Hosios condition. Moen (1997)
describes a more rigorous model in which ﬁrms advertise the wages they pay.
Other market mechanisms, such as brokers, may also bring about eﬃciency. Ef-
ﬁciency conditions for markets with heterogeneous agents have been derived by
Moen (1997), Shi (2001) and Mortensen and Wright (2002). In these models,
agents of a given type on one side of the market only trade with agents of a
single type on the other side. All trade therefore takes place in ordinary markets
with homogeneous agents.
Eﬃciency in an OLM can be directly related to these results. If the match
surplus share in each submarket satisﬁes the Hosios condition, then reservation
wages and proﬁts in each submarket equal the corresponding marginal products,
yielding eﬃciency. Speciﬁcally, when the βij satisfy the Hosios condition for the
submarket with si workers and kj jobs, Ysij = MPsij and Ykij = MPkij. Then
dy/dδ = dy/dµ =0 , so that the OLM will be eﬃcient.
3.3 Irreducible Overlapping Labour Markets
The previous section indicates that if wage determination takes place through
bargaining and if the match surplus shares do not satisfy the Hosios condition,
then ineﬃciency results. The consequences for the submarkets in an OLM are
the same as for ordinary markets with homogeneous workers and are already
described in the literature.
This section considers a second potential source of ineﬃciency that is partic-
ular to an OLM. In the derivation of equilibrium in Section 2.2, unemployed s1
workers can distinguish k1 jobs from k2 jobs before they seek employment, and
choose between the two submarkets. This is a form of directed search, applying
to submarkets rather than individual employers. The same assumption is ap-
plied to employers with k2 jobs, allowing them to choose whether to interview
s1 or s2 workers. This generates two submarkets, one where employers with k2
jobs interview and hire s1 workers, and one where they interview and hire s2
workers.
Now consider an alternative OLM in which employers with k2 jobs cannot
distinguish between s1 and s2 workers prior to job interviews. For example,
employers with clerk jobs may not require a college degree, so that applicants
with and without a college degree would apply. This would occur if employers
passively await job applicants, employers lack information about applicants prior
to interviews, or there are legal restrictions preventing unequal treatment at the
interview stage. As a result, separate submarkets for s1 and s2 workers at k2
jobs do not form, and employers with k2 jobs face a labor market with pooled
s1 and s2 workers. If no pooling occured in actual labour markets, employers
would know everything relevant about prospective workers before interviews,
10and interviews would serve no role in selecting workers. Some degree of pooling
is therefore likely in actual labour markets. The following deﬁnition formalizes
the distinction between the two forms of an OLM.
Deﬁnition 4 In a reducible Overlapping Labour Market, agents distinguish
among types of agents with whom they match, so that the Overlapping Labour
Market resolves into submarkets with one type of worker and one type of job.
The OLM considered in this section is irreducible since separate submar-
kets for s1 and s2 workers seeking k2 jobs will not form. Equilibrium in this
irreducible OLM is determined as follows. As before, s1 workers choose be-
tween seeking k1 and k2 jobs. The proportion seeking k2 jobs, δ, then satisﬁes
Ys11 = Ys12 in equilibrium. Employers with k2 jobs will hire both s1 and s2
workers as they arrive for interviews, rather than some employers hiring s1
workers and some employers hiring s2 workers. Employers will then face a com-
mon vacancy rate in the market, v2. Since the s1 and s2 workers seeking k2
jobs are pooled in a single labor market, they will also experience a common
unemployment rate, u2. The number of s1 and s2 workers seeking k2 jobs is
δNs1 + Ns2. Assume the matching function in this submarket, with pooled s1
and s2 workers, is the same as in the other submarkets. Substituting the market
ratio η12 = Nk2/(δNs1 + Ns2) into 4 determines θ12, and then u2 and v2 are
found from 3. Although µ is no longer determined by employers with k2 jobs,
the proportion of k2 jobs going to s1 workers can be calculated as
φ =
(1 − u2)δNs1





The wages for s1 and s2 workers at k2 jobs are calculated somewhat diﬀer-
ently from Section 2.1. Because of diﬀerences in outputs a12 and a22, employers
with k2 jobs will pay diﬀerent wages to s1 and s2 workers after bargaining. As
before, let w12 and w22 be the wages for s1 and s2 workers, respectively. Then
Ys12 =( 1− u2)w12 and Ys22 =( 1− u2)w22. The expected proﬁt rate for an
employer with a ﬁlled k2 job is φ(a12 − w12)+( 1− φ)(a22 − w22). Under the
simplifying assumption that the interest rate is zero, the reservation proﬁt level
used by the employer in bargaining is
Yk2 =( 1− v2)(φ(a12 − w12)+( 1− φ)(a22 − w22)) (27)
As before, let β12 and β22 b et h em a t c hs u r p l u ss h a r e sg o i n gt os1 and s2 workers
at k2 jobs, respectively. Then in equilibrium the wages must satisfy
w12 =( 1 − u2)w12 + β12(a12 − (1 − u2)w12 − Yk2) (28)
w22 =( 1 − u2)w22 + β22(a22 − (1 − u2)w22 − Yk2) (29)
Equilibrium in an irreducible OLM can be determined as follows. Consider
an arbitrary value of δ, so that η11 = Nk1/((1 − δ)Ns1). Then conditions in
Section 2.1 for the ordinary market with homogeneous agents determine u11,
11v11,w 11, and Ys11. In the pooled second submarket, δ determines θ12 as before,
φ from 26, u2 and v2 from 3, and w12 and w22 from 28 and 29 (with Yk2 given by
27). Then Ys12 can be calculated as (1−u2)w12. As δ g o e sf r o m0t o1 ,s1 workers
move from the ﬁrst submarket to the second pooled submarket, increasing Ys11
and decreasing Ys12. Equilibrium in the irreducible OLM occurs at the value of
δ such that Ys11 = Ys12.
3.4 Ineﬃciency in an Irreducible Overlapping Labour Mar-
ket
Ineﬃciency in an irreducible OLM will be analyzed by comparison with an
eﬃcient reducible OLM. The following theorem provides a benchmark case in
which the equilibrium solutions to a reducible OLM and an irreducible OLM
with the same parameters will be identical.





Then i. the reducible OLM has η12 = η22, u12 = u22, and v12 = v22; ii. the
equilibrium solution for the reducible OLM will also be the equilibrium solution
for the irreducible OLM.




























Since η12 = η22, the unemployment and vacancy rate solutions will be the same,
establishing i. Let δR be the equilibrium value of δ in the reducible OLM and let
η2 be the market ratio for the pooled submarket with both s1 and s2 workers.




= η12 = η22 (33)
Since the market ratios are the same, the pooled submarket has the same unem-
ployment and vacancy rates as the submarkets in the reducible OLM. Because
the reducible OLM was in equilibrium, Yk12 = Yk22 or
(1 − v12)(a12 − w12)=( 1− v22)(a22 − w22) (34)
Since v12 = v22 from part i, a12 − w12 = a22 − w22. Then the expected income
f o ra ne m p l o y e rw i t hak2 job in the irreducible OLM is
Yk2 =( 1 − v2)
(1 − u2)(a12 − w12)δRNs1 +( 1− u2)(a22 − w22)Ns2
(1 − u2)δRNs1 +( 1− u2)Ns2
=( 1 − v2)(a12 − w12)=( 1− v2)(a22 − w22)=Yk12 = Yk22 (35)
12Then the wages w12 and w22 from the reducible OLM will also satisfy the
bargaining conditions in the irreducible OLM. At δ = δR,Y s12 will then be the
same in the irreducible OLM as in the reducible OLM, and Ys11 will continue to
be the same. Then δR will also be the equilibrium value of δ in the irreducible
OLM and the unemployment, vacancy and wage rates will also be the same,
completing the proof.
Essentially, the irreducible OLM has the same solution as the reducible OLM
when 30 holds because employers with k2 jobs, if they could choose which work-
ers to seek, would seek the same proportion of s1 w o r k e r sa sg e n e r a t e db yt h e
pooled submarket in 26. The next theorem is a companion to theorem 5, iden-
tifying a condition in the irreducible OLM (instead of in the reducible OLM)
that indicates when the two solutions will be the same.
Theorem 6 Assume that an irreducible OLM has an equilibrium with δ = δI
and
a12 − w12 = a22 − w22 (36)
Then i. the reducible OLM with the same parameters has µ = δINs1/(δINs1 +
Ns2) and ii. the equilibrium solution for the reducible and irreducible OLM’s
are the same.
Proof. Since the irreducible OLM is in equilibrium, Ys12 = Ys11, or (1 −
u2)w12 =( 1− u11)w11. At δ = δI and µ = δINs1/(δINs1 + Ns2), a reducible

























Thus η12 = η22 in the reducible OLM and both market ratios equal η2 in the
irreducible OLM. Then u12 = u22 = u2 by Theorem 1. Using the values of
variables in the irreducible OLM, the expected incomes for employers with k2
jobs are Yk12 =( 1− u12)(a12 − w12)=( 1− u2)(a12 − w12) and Yk22 =( 1−
u2)(a22 −w22). By 36, Yk12 = Yk22. With δ = δI and µ = δINs1/(δINs1 +Ns2),
the equilibrium conditions for the reducible OLM in 17 are satisﬁed by the
equilibrium solution for the irreducible OLM, completing the proof.
With theorems 5 and 6 in place, conditions for an irreducible OLM to be
eﬃcient can now be identiﬁed.
Theorem 7 An irreducible OLM is eﬃcient if 36 holds and the reducible OLM
with the same parameters is eﬃcient.
Proof. Given 36, the solution to the irreducible OLM will be the same as
the solution to the reducible OLM with the same parameters, by theorem 6. If
the reducible OLM is eﬃcient, MPs11 = MPs12 and MPk12 = MPk22. Since
the allocation is the same, these conditions also hold for the irreducible OLM
with the same solution, establishing eﬃciency and completing the proof.
13The misallocation arising when 30 does not hold can be brieﬂy described.
Suppose a reducible OLM is eﬃcient and µ>δ N s1/(δNs1 + Ns2). Then in the
irreducible OLM with the same parameters, fewer k2 jobs will be allocated to s1
workers than for eﬃciency. The misallocation arises because, in the irreducible
OLM, employers with k2 jobs cannot shift interviews to s1 workers, for whom
the returns are higher. The misallocation of k2 jobs in this case generates a
misallocation of s1 workers. The unemployment rate for s1 workers in the irre-
ducible OLM will be given by the higher pooled rate, u2, reducing Ys12. Then
for equilibrium in the irreducible OLM, there will be fewer s1 workers seeking
k2 jobs than for eﬃciency. In response to these misallocations, it is possible to
identify policies that would move the labor market towards an eﬃcient alloca-
tion. One policy would be to tax employment of s1 workers at k1 jobs. This
would reduce Ys11 (at a given value of δ) and induce more s1 workers to seek
k2 jobs, raising δ. While δ may approach its eﬃcient level, there could still be
misallocations of k2 jobs between s1 and s2 workers, caused by pooling in the
irreducible OLM. Although the policy of taxing s1 workers at k1 jobs could
increase production, it would have distributional eﬀects on incomes of workers
and employers.
4 Distribution
4.1 Supply and Demand Shifts
An OLM diﬀers from an ordinary market with homogeneous agents in that
proportional changes in all types of jobs can aﬀect the distribution of earnings
among workers. In an ordinary market with homogeneous agents, changes in
supply or demand aﬀect the distribution of income between workers and em-
ployers. However, questions about the distribution of earnings among workers
are absent for the simple reason that all workers are aﬀected uniformly (at least
ex ante). This section analyzes the impact of proportional changes in all workers
or jobs.
Speciﬁcally, assume
Nkj = ρNkj0,j =1 ,2 (38)
where Nkj0 is ﬁxed, j =1 ,2. An increase in ρ therefore represents a proportional
e x p a n s i o ni nt h en u m b e r so fb o t ht y p e so fj o b s . T h ee ﬀect of ρ on the wage
































This result immediately yields the following proposition.
14Proposition 8 Theorem 9 Comparing two ordinary markets with homoge-
neous labour that experience the same increase in the tightness ratio θ, the
labour market with the lower tightness ratio (and higher unemployment rate)
will experience the greater proportional wage increase.
From 5, dθij/dηij > 0. The market ratios are proportional to ρ so that
∂ηij/∂ρ > 0,i , j=1 ,2. The other partial derivatives in the brackets in 39































Now consider how δ and µ change when ρ goes up. In hierarchical assignment
models, more productive workers are generally assigned to more productive
jobs. With a top-down assignment, an increase in numbers of all jobs results
in workers being reassigned to more productive jobs. The same phenomenon is
at work in an OLM. Type s1 workers at k2 jobs serve as a potential source of
workers for k1 jobs. When numbers of jobs increase, s1 workers shift from k2
jobs to k1 jobs (if the diﬀerence in output a11 − a12 is suﬃciently large). Then
δ is smaller for larger ρ. The decline in s1 workers at k2 jobs leads employers
with k2 jobs to switch to s2 workers, reducing µ.
Now compare the proportional changes in w11 and w22 in moving to a higher







Since ∂η11/∂δ > 0, t h ed e c l i n ei nδ contributes to a lower proportional change
in w11. Since ∂η22/∂µ < 0, the decline in µ contributes to a greater proportional
change in w22. On the basis of these comparisons, if θ11 >θ 22, ap r o p o r t i o n a l
increase in jobs would reduce w11/w22. A proportional increase in numbers of
workers, Ns1 and Ns2, would have the same eﬀe c t sa sar e d u c t i o ni nρ.
Table 1 shows the distributional eﬀects of ρ =1 .02 versus ρ = .98 using
the same assumptions as for Figure 1. At the higher level of ρ, w11/w22 is
lower, consistent with the foregoing analysis and the declines in δ and µ.U s i n g
expected earnings to compare s1 and s2 workers, Ys11/Ys22 is also lower at a
higher ρ. Thus proportional changes in numbers of jobs or numbers of workers
have distributional impacts in an OLM.
Table 1











Table 1 can also be used to describe the adjustment of an OLM to diﬀerent
states in a business cycle.7 Because of the adjustments in δ and µ, the submarket
with more productive s1 workers and k1 jobs experiences smaller ﬂuctuations
in wages and unemployment rates than the submarket with s2 workers and k2
jobs.
It is possible to undertake comparative static analysis of changes in individ-
ual parameters in the OLM. For example, an increase in Ns2, corresponding to
an inﬂux of less-skilled workers, results in Yk22 >Y k12 at the former levels of
δ and µ. Then using the analysis in Figure 1, it can be shown that δ and µ
decline, Yk22 and Yk12 increase, Ys11 and Ys12 decline, and both w11 and w22
decline. The inﬂux of less skilled workers results in wage declines for all workers
in the OLM.
4.2 Productivity Increases
Changes in the output levels aij can also have distributional eﬀects. If the
output levels aij all increase by the same proportion, then an increase in all
wages by the same proportion will return the OLM to equilibrium with no
changes in δ, µ, market ratios or relative incomes. If the output levels change
by unequal proportions, then there will in general be distributional impacts. An
increase in a11, holding a12 and a22 constant, can be interpreted as skill biased
technological change, which has been proposed as an explanation for observed
increases in skill diﬀerentials.8
In a number of theoretical contexts, skill biased technological change can
be shown to yield an increase in skill diﬀerentials. Using the OLM, the ef-
f e c t so fa ni n c r e a s ei na11 can be determined and yield an increase in w11/w22.
However, this result does not by itself establish that skill biased technological
change is present or that it is the cause of observed increases in skill diﬀerentials,
since other changes could also raise skill diﬀerentials. For example, Section 4.1
7Equilibrium in an OLM is derived in Section 2.2 assuming workers and empoyers believe
conditions will continue indeﬁnitely. Application of the solutions to diﬀerent stages in a
business cycle requires the assumption that expectations correspond to current conditions.
8It is also possible to interpret skill biased technological change as an increase in both a11
and a12, which would require a diﬀerent analysis.
16shows that a proportional increase in labour supply can raise the skill diﬀer-
ential w11/w22 while raising the ratio of s1 workers at k1 jobs to s2 workers
at k2 jobs, (1 − u11)Ns1/((1 − u22)Ns2).The following theorem provides ancil-
lary consequences that could be used to determine whether an increase in skill
diﬀerentials is caused by skill biased technological change.
Theorem 10 Consider a reducible OLM in equilibrium with δ = δ0, µ = µ0
and θ12 = θ0.S u p p o s ea11 increases, with all other parameters staying the same.
Then in the new equilibrium, i. θ12 >θ 0, ii. u12 is lower, v12 is higher, w12 is
higher, Ys12 is higher and Yk12 is lower; iii. Ys11 is higher and Yk22 is lower;
iv. µ is lower, θ22 is higher and u22 is lower; v. δ and θ11 are lower and u11 is
higher.
Proof. The result concerning θ12 will be established using the argument for
existence and uniqueness in Section 2.2. At b θ12 = θ0, the derived value of Ys12
stays the same. Since Ys11 at δ0 increases (from the higher value of a11), the
derived value of δ (at which Ys11 = Ys12) must be lower. The derived value
of η12 at θ0, given by µNk2/(δNs1), increases. By 5, the derived value H(θ0)
also increases. Thus the function H( b θ12) in Figure 1 shifts upward, so that the
equilibrium value of θ12 must be greater, establishing i. The results in ii. follow
from i. using the results in Section 2.1. Since Ys11 = Ys12,Y s11 is greater in
the new equilibrium; since Yk22 = Yk12,Y k22 is lower in the new equilibrium,
establishing iii. The lower value of Yk22 implies η22 and θ22 are higher, from
14. Then µ and u22 must be lower, establishing iv. Since θ12 is higher from i.,
η12 is also higher. Since µ is lower while η12 = µNk2/(δNs1) is higher, δ must
be lower. Then η11 and θ11 are lower and u11 is higher, establishing v. and
completing the proof.
The most notable result in theorem 9 is that the unemployment rate for s1
workers at k1 jobs increases, since s1 workers shift from seeking k2 to seeking k1
jobs. At the same time, the unemployment rate for s1 workers at k2 jobs goes
down.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has emphasized diﬀerences between OLM’s and ordinary markets
with homogeneous or heterogeneous workers. Conditions for eﬃciency in or-
dinary markets with homogeneous workers are extended to irreducible OLM’s
in theorems 5 through 7. When employers with k2 jobs do not distinguish be-
tween s1 and s2 workers at the interview or meeting stage, a misallocation of
interviews arises unless 30 holds.
In an ordinary market with homogeneous workers, supply and demand shifts
can have no eﬀects on relative wages of workers since all workers are aﬀected
uniformly. However, in an OLM, a proportional increase in all jobs can have
distributional impacts. In the example shown in Table 1, a proportional increase
in jobs reduces the wage diﬀerential w11/w22. Relative wage changes previously
attributed to skill biased technological change could then be generated by simple
17changes in supply and demand. Theorem 9 provides results that can be used to
distinguish between skill biased technological change and other causes.
An essential feature of OLM’s is that s1 workers at k2 jobs serve as a reserve
of labour for the more productive k1 jobs. Then an increase in output at k1
jobs, or simply a proportional increase in all jobs, can lead s1 workers to shift
to seeking k1 jobs. Depending on the availability of s1 workers, employers with
k2 jobs may shift the jobs away from the low-paid s2 workers.
While a market is a fundamental concept in economics, the boundaries of a
market are poorly deﬁned in both product and factor markets. With extensive
heterogeneity among workers and among jobs, it is unlikely that knowledge of
worker and job types would be suﬃcient to partition labour markets so ﬁnely
that each worker was in an ordinary market with homogeneous agents. Alterna-
tively, it can be characterized as an ordinary labour market with heterogeneous
agents only if workers and employers have so little knowledge of each other that
they waste substantial time in meetings and interviews that could not lead to
matches. Neither ordinary markets with homogeneous agents nor ordinary mar-
kets with heterogeneous agents can realistically characterize aggregate labour
markets. Overlapping Labour Markets arise with partial but incomplete knowl-
edge of the types with which an agent matches and therefore provides a more
faithful representation of actual labour markets.
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